by Roderick W. Smith, rodsmith@rodsbooks.com
Originally written: November 13, 2012; last Web page update: April 6, 2024, referencing rEFInd 0.14.2
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This page is part of the documentation for the rEFInd boot manager. If a Web search has brought you here, you may want to start at the main page.
If you're using a computer that supports Secure Boot, you may run into extra complications. This feature is intended to make it difficult for malware to insert itself early into the computer's boot process. Unfortunately, it also complicates multi-boot configurations such as those that rEFInd is intended to manage. This page describes some Secure Boot basics and two specific ways of using rEFInd with Secure Boot: Using the Shim program and using the PreLoader program. (My separate EFI Boot Loaders for Linux page on Secure Boot covers the additional topics of disabling Secure Boot and adding keys to the firmware's own set of keys.) This page concludes with a look at known bugs and limitations in rEFInd's Secure Boot features.
As of version 10.11 ("El Capitan"), macOS uses its own new security feature, System Integrity Protection (SIP), which creates its own set of hoops through which rEFInd users must jump. See the rEFInd and System Integrity Protection page for details. Macs that include the T2 security chip (introduced in 2018) support a feature that Apple calls Secure Boot, but it's unclear to me if this is the same as UEFI Secure Boot. See Apple's Secure Boot documentation for details. If it is the same, then this page should apply to the latest Macs, although you'll need to adjust Secure Boot through Apple's Startup Security Utility rather than through a PC-style firmware setup utility outside of the OS.
Microsoft requires that non-server computers that display Windows 8 or later logos ship with Secure Boot enabled. As a practical matter, this also means that such computers ship with Microsoft's keys in their firmware. In the absence of an industry-standard body to manage the signing of Secure Boot keys, this means that Microsoft's key is the only one that's more-or-less guaranteed to be installed on the computer, thus blocking the ability to boot any OS that lacks a boot path through Microsoft's signing key. In other words, although it's not specified this way in the UEFI specification, Microsoft is effectively the Secure Boot gatekeeper.
Fortunately, Microsoft will sign third-party binaries with their key—or more precisely, with a key that Microsoft uses to sign third-party binaries. (Microsoft uses another key to sign its own binaries, and some devices, such as the Microsoft Surface tablet, lack the third-party Microsoft key.) A payment of $99 to Verisign enables a software distributor to sign as many binaries as desired. Red Hat (Fedora), Novell (SUSE), Canonical (Ubuntu), and several smaller distributions are all using this system to enable their boot loaders to run. ALT Linux provides a how-to document on having a binary signed with Microsoft's key, if you're interested in the details. Unfortunately, using a third-party signing service is an awkward solution for open source software. In fact, for this very reason two separate programs exist that shift the Secure Boot "train" from Microsoft's proprietary "track" to one that's more friendly to open source authors. Both of these programs (Shim and PreLoader) are available in binary form signed by Microsoft's key. PreLoader enables the computer to launch binaries that the user has explicitly identified as being OK. Shim enables the computer to launch binaries that are signed by a key that's built into it or that the user adds to a list known as the Machine Owner Key (MOK) list. Recent versions of Shim also support single-binary registrations, much as PreLoader does. Distributions beginning with Ubuntu 12.10 (and 12.04.2), Fedora 18, and OpenSUSE 12.3 use Shim, although Ubuntu 12.10 initially shipped with an early version of Shim that's useless for launching rEFInd because it lacked support for the MOK list. (Current versions of Ubuntu ship with more flexible versions of Shim.) PreLoader is used by some smaller and more specialized distributions, such as Arch Linux. You can switch from one to the other if you like, no matter what your distribution uses by default. Shim is definitely the more popular of these programs, and is more likely to work correctly in most situations, although there are exceptions to this rule.
There are three ways to sign a binary that will get it launched on a computer that uses Shim:
All three key types are the same in form—Shim's built-in keys and MOKs are both generated using the same tools used to generate Secure Boot keys. The keys can be generated with the common openssl program, but signing EFI binaries requires either of two rarer programs: sbsign or pesign. If you use Shim with a distribution that doesn't support Secure Boot, you'll need to either sign the kernels yourself, which can be a hassle, or launch the kernels by way of a boot loader that doesn't check for signatures, such as ELILO. (Note, however, that many Linux distributions have begun to enforce a chain of trust beyond the boot loader and kernel. This means that if you try to boot using ELILO or some other tool that doesn't enforce Secure Boot, subsequent parts of the boot process may fail.)
Both Secure Boot and Shim support a sort of anti-authorization key or hash. These keys or hashes identify binaries that must not be launched — typically, they're known malware, or at least they're known to contain bugs that could be exploited to create security problems.
PreLoader and recent versions of Shim are easier to set up on a distribution that doesn't support Secure Boot because these tools don't require the use of keys; instead, you can tell them which binaries you trust and they will let you launch them. This works well on a system with boot managers, boot loaders, and kernels that seldom change. It's not a good solution for distribution maintainers, though, because it requires that users manually add binaries to the MOK's list of approved binaries when the OS is installed and every time those binaries change. Also, PreLoader relies on a helper program, HashTool, to enroll hashes. ("Hash" is Geek for "tell the computer that a binary is OK.") Unfortunately, the initial (and, as far as I know, only signed) HashTool can enroll hashes only from the partition from which it was launched, so if you want to use rEFInd to launch Linux kernels directly, it's easiest if you mount your EFI System Partition (ESP) at /boot in Linux or copy your kernels to the ESP. Another approach is to copy HashTool.efi to the partition that holds your kernel and rename it to almost anything else. rEFInd will then treat it like an OS boot loader and create a menu entry for it, enabling you to launch it as needed. Recent versions of Shim's key- and hash-management tool, MokManager, support reading keys and binaries from any partition that the EFI can read.
rEFInd can communicate with the Shim system to authenticate boot loaders. If a boot loader has been signed by a valid UEFI Secure Boot key, a valid Shim key, or a valid MOK, rEFInd will launch it. rEFInd will also launch unsigned boot loaders or those with invalid signatures if Secure Boot is disabled in or unsupported by the firmware. (If that's your situation, you needn't bother reading this page.) PreLoader is designed in such a way that it requires no explicit support in rEFInd to work.
My binary builds of rEFInd version 0.5.0 and later ship signed with my own keys, and I provide the public version of this key with the rEFInd package. This can help simplify setup, since you needn't generate your own keys to get rEFInd working. The rEFInd PPA for Ubuntu ships unsigned binaries, but the installation script that runs automatically when the package is installed signs the binaries with a local key as it installs them. In either case, if you lack public keys for the boot loaders that rEFInd launches, you'll need to sign your boot loaders, as described in the Managing Your MOKs section. Public keys matching most signed binaries are available, though, so chances are you'll be able to enroll them as MOKs, if necessary.
Because several major distributions support Shim, I describe it first. You may need to adjust the rEFInd installation process to get it working with Shim, especially if you're not using a distribution that uses this software. In addition to installing Shim, you should know how to manage your MOKs, so I describe this topic, too. If you don't want to use Shim, you can skip ahead to the section on PreLoader; however, in 2021 PreLoader offers few advantages and many disadvantages compared to Shim, so I strongly recommend using Shim rather than PreLoader. Note also that you can use Shim with hashes to identify individual binaries rather than with keys. This usage of Shim is much more like the PreLoader procedure, although a few details differ.
A working Secure Boot installation of rEFInd involves at least three programs, and probably four or more, each of which must be installed in a specific way:
If you've installed a distribution that provides Shim and can boot it with Secure Boot active, and if you then install rEFInd using the RPM file or Debian package that I provide or by running refind-install, chances are you'll end up with a working rEFInd that will start up the first time, with one caveat: You'll have to use MokManager to add rEFInd's MOK to your MOK list, as described shortly. If you don't already have a working copy of Shim on your ESP, your task is more complex. Broadly speaking, the procedure should be something like this:
At this point the computer may boot into its default OS, reboot, or perhaps even hang. When you reboot it, though, rEFInd should start up in Secure Boot mode. You can verify this by selecting the About rEFInd tool in the main menu. Check the Platform item in the resulting screen; it should verify that Secure Boot is active. You should now be able to launch any boot loader signed with a key recognized by the firmware or by Shim (including any MOKs you've enrolled). If you want to manage keys in the future, rEFInd displays a new icon in the second (tools) row you can use to launch MokManager. (This icon appears by default if MokManager is installed, but if you edit showtools in refind.conf, you must be sure to include mok_tool as an option in order to gain access to it.)
If you're using rEFInd to boot multiple Linux versions, chances are you'll need to add the keys for the distributions whose Shim you're not using as MOKs. rEFInd ships with a selection of such keys and copies them to the keys subdirectory of the rEFInd installation directory on the ESP as a convenience. Note that you must enroll keys with .cer or .der filename extensions. Although .crt files contain the same information, their format is different and they cannot be used by MokManager.
The preceding instructions provided the basics of getting rEFInd up and running, including using MokManager to enroll a MOK on your computer. If you need to sign binaries, though, you'll have to use additional tools. The OpenSSL package provides the cryptographic tools necessary, but actually signing EFI binaries requires additional software. Two packages for this are available: sbsigntool and pesign. Most distributions ship with at least one of them. The following procedure uses sbsigntool. To sign your own binaries, follow these steps (you can skip the first five steps if you've successfully used refind-install's --localkeys option):
$ openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout refind_local.key \ -out refind_local.crt -nodes -days 3650 -subj "/CN=Your Name/" $ openssl x509 -in refind_local.crt -out refind_local.cer -outform DERChange Your Name to your own name or other identifying characteristics, and adjust the certificate's time span (set via -days) as you see fit. If you omit the -nodes option, the program will prompt you for a passphrase for added security. Remember this, since you'll need it to sign your binaries. The result is a private key file (refind_local.key), which is highly sensitive since it's required to sign binaries, and two public keys (refind_local.crt and refind_local.cer), which can be used to verify signed binaries' authenticity. The two public key files are equivalent, but are used by different tools—sbsigntool uses refind_local.crt to sign binaries, but MokManager uses refind_local.cer to enroll the key. If you used refind-install's --localkeys option, this step is unnecessary, since these keys have already been created and are stored in /etc/refind.d/keys/.
At this point you should be able to launch the binaries you've signed. Unfortunately, there can still be problems; see the upcoming section, Secure Boot Caveats, for information on them. Alternatively, you can try using PreLoader rather than Shim.
If you want to use Secure Boot with a distribution that doesn't come with Shim but the preceding description exhausts you, take heart: PreLoader is easier to set up and use for your situation! (Alternatively, you can use recent versions of Shim with hashes instead of with keys, in which case the PreLoader instructions apply to Shim, albeit with some user interface differences.) Unfortunately, PreLoader is still not as easy to use as not using Secure Boot at all, and it's got some drawbacks, but it may represent an acceptable middle ground. To get started, proceed as follows:
If you did everything right, rEFInd should now launch follow-on boot loaders and kernels, including both programs signed with the platform's Secure Boot keys and binaries that you've authorized with HashTool. If you need to authorize additional programs, you can do so from rEFInd by using the MOK utility tool icon that launches HashTool.efi from the second row of icons. (This icon should appear by default, but if you uncomment the showtools token in refind.conf, be sure that mok_tool is present among the options.)
Although PreLoader is easier to set up than Shim, particularly if you need to launch programs or kernels that aren't already signed, it suffers from the problem that you must register every new program you install, including Linux kernels if you launch them directly from rEFInd. This need can be a hassle if you update your kernels frequently, and every new registration chews up a little space in your NVRAM. Nonetheless, PreLoader can be a good Secure Boot solution for many users or if you want to build a portable Linux installation that you can use on any computer with minimal fuss.
Once you've configured rEFInd to use Secure Boot, it will usually keep working for a good long time; however, there are a couple of maintenance items you may want to consider. The first of these is keeping your Shim binary up-to-date. Most Linux distributions install new Shim binaries from time to time; but they usually assume that the computer uses GRUB to boot, and so will seldom update rEFInd's Shim binary automatically. (The MokManager utility must usually be updated in lockstep with the Shim binary, as well.) The second maintenance item is to replace your rEFInd MOK (or Secure Boot db key, if you took complete control of your computer's Secure Boot process), if and when that becomes necessary. The local signing keys created by the refind-install script last for ten years. Because this support was added in late 2012, some local signing have already expired, or are close to expiration. (The keys I use to sign binaries I build locally were created with 20-year lifespans, so they won't expire until December 1, 2032.) Key expiration may not be a big deal, though; in my tests, neither Shim nor the computers I've tested enforce key expiration dates. It may therefore be possible to use even a long-expired key indefinitely. I can't promise this will always be true, though, and in fact I've heard of one server that does enforce key expiration dates. Thus, it's probably prudent to keep ahead of this matter.
The refind-sb-healthcheck script can help with maintaining both the Shim you use to launch rEFInd and Secure Boot keys. This script is interactive, and it produces a fair amount of output, which can vary greatly from one computer to another. It includes a number of pause points so that you can read the just-generated output, but in some cases this output may scroll off a screen. It's therefore best to run it in a GUI Terminal program rather than at a text-mode console.
To begin, run refind-sb-healthcheck as root or using sudo. (If you run it as an ordinary user, the script will try to escalate its privilege level.) The script begins by trying to update Shim, if your computer uses Shim to boot. (If the script detects a non-Shim boot path, as when you completely control Secure Boot, then it skips this part.)
$ sudo refind-sb-healthcheck *********************************" * Checking Secure Boot status.... ********************************* Secure Boot is active Shim program detected ***************************************************** * Checking for updates to Shim on the ESP and in /usr ***************************************************** Detected ESP mounted at /boot/efi The current Shim program is /boot/efi//EFI/refind/shimx64.efi Its date stamp is: 2019-02-28-19:39 Newer Shim programs are: --> 2023-03-01-03:05: /boot/efi/EFI/ubuntu/shimx64.efi --> Found matching mmx64.efi --> 2023-01-31-11:57: /usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi --> Found matching mmx64.efi The newest Shim candidate is /boot/efi/EFI/ubuntu/shimx64.efi, with a date of 2023-03-01-03:05 Do you want to copy the newer Shim binary over the current one (y/N)? y Backing up current Shim and MokManager programs.... Copying /boot/efi/EFI/ubuntu/shimx64.efi to /boot/efi//EFI/refind/ Copying /boot/efi/EFI/ubuntu/mmx64.efi to /boot/efi//EFI/refind/ Press the Enter key to continue:
In this example, the script has identified that the computer booted through Shim, and it's searched the ESP and the /usr directory tree for a more recent Shim than the one used to boot the computer. The script uses the files' date stamps to determine their age, not the Shim binaries' version numbers! The version numbers would be a better measure of which Shim is the most recent, but version numbers are very difficult to identify, so refind-sb-healthcheck uses the date stamps instead. This is a reasonable, but imperfect, proxy. As noted in the output, the script also looks for a matching mmx64.efi (MokManager) binary; it will not offer to copy a Shim binary without a matching MokManager.
In this example, the script has identified a newer Shim binary than the one rEFInd used, and has offered to copy it over the existing rEFInd Shim binary. The newer binary is part of an Ubuntu installation on the ESP. This is a common configuration; distributions frequently update their own on-ESP boot managers' Shim programs, even if they don't update rEFInd's Shim. Also, in this example, two Shim binaries were found. They are in fact identical, but the one on the ESP has a later timestamp because it was copied after it was written to the /usr/lib/shim directory.
When copying a newer Shim binary, refind-sb-healthcheck backs up the original Shim and MokManager binaries by renaming them with .backup added to their filenames. This should enable you to restore the originals if the new binaries give you problems; however, you'll need to boot in some other way, at least into an EFI shell, to do so. Thus, I recommend proceeding with this operation only if you know how to do this.
With the Shim binary updated (or the update bypassed, deferred, or unnecessary), refind-sb-healthcheck proceeds to check the rEFInd local keys' expiration dates:
************************************************* * Checking the local rEFInd keys' expiration date ************************************************* Current date is 2023-03-01 rEFInd local key's expiration date is 2022-12-07 rEFInd's local Secure Boot key has expired! Replacing this key with a new one is recommended! Do you want to replace the current rEFInd local key (y/N)?
Unlike checking the Shim binaries' relative ages, this check digs into the key files themselves to identify their expiration dates. In this example, the local keys have expired, so the program gives you the chance to update them. If you choose to do so, the old keys are moved to the /etc/refind.d/keys/backup directory and fresh keys are created in /etc/refind.d/keys. If the existing keys have a year or more of life left in them, refind-sb-healthcheck will declare that replacing the keys is not recommended and move on; you can skip ahead a bit in this example.
If you choose to upgrade your keys, refind-sb-healthcheck asks if you want to encrypt them. Encrypting keys means that you'll have to enter a password to use them, which can be a nuisance; but this also makes it much harder for an intruder to use your keys.
Do you want to replace the current rEFInd local key (y/N)? y Do you want to encrypt your new keys (y/N)? n Generating a fresh set of local keys.... ....+...+.....+......+.+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++*......+.....+...+..........+...+...+.....+.....................+.+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++*....+...+.....+...+...+.......+........+.+......+...+...........+.+..+...+.........+.+........+.+.....+....+.....+..........+......+...+...............+.....+............+...+.+............+.....+....+......+........+............+.............+......+...+......+..+..................+.+......+...............+...+..+.......+..+......+....+...+..+....+..+.........+....+..+....+...+........+.............+..+...+..........+.....................+.....+...+......+......+.............+.....+...+....+..............................+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ .....+..................+.+..+............+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++*.......+..............+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++*..........+..+.....................+....+...+..+.+..+.+...........+...+.+...........+......+...+.....................+...+.......+.....+...+.+..+....+........+...+...+.+.....+.+.........+......+....................+.........+.+.....+...+......+......+.......+..+.............+.....+...+...+......+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ----- Once the new key is used to sign an EFI binary, the key must be available to the EFI to authenticate the newly-signed binaries. Do you want to enroll the new key in your firmware as a MOK (Y/n)? y input password: input password again: You must reboot after running this program to finish enrolling the MOK. Remember the password you just entered and opt to enroll the MOK in the MokManager program that should appear after you reboot. This program will prompt you to reboot when it ends. Press the Enter key to continue:
Whatever choices you make regarding rEFInd's local keys, once this is done the script moves on to checking the MOKs, db keys, KEKs, and PKs that are enrolled in your computer's NVRAM:
********************************************** * Checking the enrolled MOKs' expiration dates ********************************************** Key # 1 seems OK (expires 2031-02-23) Issuer: CN=Locally-generated rEFInd key Key # 2 seems OK (expires 2032-12-01) Issuer: CN=Roderick W. Smith, rodsmith@rodsbooks.com Key # 3 seems OK (expires 2025-02-18) Issuer: CN=Ringworld 2015-02-21 DB Key # 4 seems OK (expires 2034-12-24) Issuer: CN=openSUSE Secure Boot CA, C=DE, L=Nuremberg, O=openSUSE Project/emailAddress=build@opensuse.org Key # 5 has expired! (Expired on 2021-03-20.) Replacing this key with a new one is recommended! Issuer: C=US, L=SomeCity, O=SomeOrg Key # 6 seems OK (expires 2042-04-11) Issuer: C=GB, ST=Isle of Man, L=Douglas, O=Canonical Ltd., CN=Canonical Ltd. Master Certificate Authority Discovered one or more expired or soon-to-be-expired MOK! Check the above listing and consider looking for a replacement key. If a replacement key has already been installed, then the old key will do no harm; however, if a new key has not been installed, then Secure Boot verification of the affected OS(es) may be impaired. Press the Enter key to continue:
The first set of keys to be examined is the MOKs. In this example, six MOKs are enrolled. Of those, five expire more than a year in the future and so are not reported in detail; however, the fifth MOK has already expired! (This example was run in March of 2023.) In most of my code listings, I use bold text to denote something you type; but the refind-sb-healthcheck script uses bold text to help draw your attention to keys that have expired or that will expire soon. The Issuer field isn't very informative in this example, but in fact this is a very old Canonical key (for the Ubuntu Linux distribution).
Old MOKs aren't necessarily a problem. Typically, the issuer will release an updated MOK before the old one expires, and as long as the new MOK is installed and any programs signed with the old MOK are updated before the expiration date, everything will work fine. In the preceding output, for instance, key #6 is a newer Canonical key, which renders key #5 redundant. If desired, you can use mokutil in Linux or MokManager in EFI to delete the old MOK. Although this isn't required, it is desirable — an old key can be a security risk because it might have been used to sign programs that had security vulnerabilities, and it's better if your computer not run such programs. In any event, you should do some more digging to discover what the expired MOK is and determine if an updated MOK is available. You can obtain a complete list of installed MOKs by typing mokutil --list-installed, but be aware that the output is copious because it includes a lot of technical details.
After checking MOKs, refind-sb-healthcheck moves on to the UEFI's Secure Boot db:
************************************************* * Checking the enrolled db keys' expiration dates ************************************************* Key # 1 seems OK (expires 2026-10-19) Issuer: C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010 Key # 2 seems OK (expires 2026-06-27) Issuer: C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root Press the Enter key to continue:
This example is typical of a stock setup; it includes nothing but two Microsoft keys. Both expire in 2026, so there's no imminent threat of Secure Boot problems arising from their expiration.
If you've taken complete control of Secure Boot on your computer, then you may have several keys in the db. There may also be another key or two even on a stock setup, because some manufacturers install a key of their own, or sometimes a trusted third-party key.
If you do find outdated keys in the db, then there's not much you can do about it, except by taking complete control of Secure Boot. This is a tricky process, so it's probably not worth attempting unless you're technically inclined and well-motivated. It's also conceivable that a firmware update or even an OS update will remove old db keys and replace them with new ones.
Finally, refind-sb-healthcheck reports on the KEK and PK entries:
********************************************** * Checking the enrolled KEKs' expiration dates ********************************************** Key # 1 seems OK (expires 2026-06-24) Issuer: C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root ********************************************* * Checking the enrolled PKs' expiration dates ********************************************* Key # 1 has expired! (Expired on 2018-04-09.) Replacing this key with a new one is recommended! Issuer: CN=Root Agency Discovered one or more expired or soon-to-be-expired Secure Boot keys! Replacing PK, KEK, or db keys is a job for experts; see https://www.rodsbooks.com/efi-bootloaders/controlling-sb.html for details. You must reboot the computer to finish key management. you can do so yourself, or this program can reboot right now. Do you want to reboot IMMEDIATELY (y/N)?
Secure Boot supports just one PK per computer, and most computers have just one (or occasionally two) KEKs, so there's no built-in pause in refind-sb-healthcheck's reporting of these keys.
This example turns up something interesting: Although the KEK has yet to expire, the PK (which is the top-level key, upon which all other Secure Boot keys ultimately depend) has expired! This example is based on an ASROCK FM2A88M motherboard, which was introduced in 2013. Its PK was created in 2013 and had a mere 5-year lifespan. The computer has never run Windows, so there's been no chance of key updates from Microsoft. (That said, the PK appears to come from ASROCK, so they're the ones who would have to have issued updates to the PK, barring my taking control of the Secure Boot subsystem myself.) Despite the expiration of the PK, Secure Boot seems to be functioning correctly on this computer, so no harm has come from this (apparent) problem.
As had been promised when I opted to enroll my new rEFInd MOK in the NVRAM, the script now prompts to reboot the computer. Selecting Y will do so; pressing the Enter key or typing N will not. The next time the computer reboots, though, it will enter the MokManager EFI program, which was described briefly earlier. After typing your password, you should tell it to finish enrolling your new MOK. If you fail to do so, though, you should be able to do so in the future by reading the MOK off the ESP, just as after installing rEFInd.
Be aware that the refind-sb-healthcheck script is new with rEFInd version 0.14.0 (released in March of 2023). It may contain bugs, and it performs potentially dangerous tasks &mdash replacing files, adjusting rEFInd local Secure Boot keys, and adjusting the MOK list. Thus, you should treat refind-sb-healthcheck with extra care!
rEFInd's Secure Boot originated with version 0.5.0 of the program, and was revamped for version 0.6.2, both released in late 2012. It's worked well for myself and several others with whom I've corresponded; but you might still run into problems. Some issues you might encounter include the following:
If you launch a boot loader or other program from rEFInd that relies on the EFI's standard program-launching code, that program should take advantage of Shim and its MOKs. For instance, if you launch gummiboot (aka systemd-boot) from rEFInd (and rEFInd from Shim), gummiboot should be able to launch Shim/MOK-signed Linux kernels. In practice, this may not work with all versions of Shim, though. Shim 0.8 and later enables the binary that it launches to launch just one additional binary, not an endless stream of them. (rEFInd employs an internal workaround to this problem to do its own job.)
My focus in testing rEFInd's Secure Boot capabilities has been on getting Linux kernels with EFI stub loaders to launch correctly. I've done some minimal testing with GRUB 2, though. I've also tested some self-signed binaries, such as an EFI shell and MokManager. (The EFI shell launches, but will not itself launch anything that's not been signed with a UEFI Secure Boot key. This of course limits its utility.)
Some of the awkwardness of using rEFInd with Secure Boot is due to the need to manage MOKs (either keys with Shim or hashes with PreLoader). Such problems would evaporate if you could get a copy of rEFInd signed with your distribution's Secure Boot key. Thus, if you're annoyed by such problems, try filing a feature request with your distribution maintainer to have them include rEFInd (and sign it!) with their official package set.
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